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Inquiry into the origins of partisan polarization has generally treated polarization as a simple, symmetric
phenomenon—the degree to which the worldviews of the mass Democratic and Republican parties have or have not
diverged from one another. In this article, we disaggregate polarization into its constituent parts, the dynamic
preferences of the mass Democratic and Republican Parties. This approach allows for the possibility that intraparty
dynamics may influence interparty differences and for the integration of studies of polarization with literatures
addressing other dynamics in aggregate public opinion. Building on individual-level research on partisan identities
and macrolevel research on public mood, we argue that party polarization may be catalyzed, in part, by the
mass parties’ differential responsiveness to changes in the macro political-economic context. We find support for
this position, showing asymmetries in the dynamics of polarization that are associated with differential partisan
responsiveness to domestic policy choices.
M
ass partisan polarization is among the most
important phenomena in American poli-
tics over the past 40 years and the object of
a large and growing scholarly literature.1 Although
scholars disagree about the degree to which mass
political parties in the United States have polarized
and the consequences of this polarization for politics
and policy, there is consensus that the political
worldviews of the Democratic and Republican parties
in the electorate have grown significantly farther
apart from one another (see Hetherington 2009 and
Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006 for reviews of
this literature).
Despite substantial inquiry into the causes and
consequences of polarization, however, most research
has treated polarization as a simple, symmetric
phenomenon—the degree to which the worldviews of
the mass Democratic and Republican parties have or
have not diverged from each other in some issue or
ideological space. This approach creates two critical
shortcomings for understanding what polarization is
and what its consequences are. First, an emphasis on
interparty difference ignores the role that intraparty
opinion dynamics play in shaping party polarization, in
particular the possibility that polarization is driven
more strongly by one parties’ preferences than anoth-
er’s. Second, the treatment of ‘‘polarization’’ as a
distinct concept, rather than a construction of changes
in the preferences of each party considered separately,
isolates the study of polarization from other literatures
on the dynamics of aggregate public opinion.
This article addresses these limitations and sheds
light on their substantive consequences by integrating
the study of mass partisan polarization with research
investigating the dynamics of aggregate policy senti-
ment (e.g., Durr 1993; Erikson, MacKuen, and
Stimson 2002; Soroka and Wlezien 2010). Drawing
on microlevel research on partisanship and macro-
level research on the dynamics of public mood, we
contribute a theoretical account of the dynamics of
aggregate partisan opinion change that predicts
partisan polarization as a function of dynamics in
the macropolitical context. In turn, this leads us to
assess party-level opinion dynamics to better under-
stand how and why Republicans and Democrats have
polarized as they have.
To analyze party-specific dynamics in aggregate
public opinion, we use data from the General Social
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Survey to generate a time-serial measure of macro
policy sentiment which strongly corresponds to Stim-
son’s (1999) policy mood index. We then disaggregate
this measure into time series of Republican and
Democratic (as well as independents’) preferences.
Consistent with prior research, we find growing
divergence between Democratic and Republican pref-
erences on this dimension. However, we also find that
this general result obscures important nuances in the
dynamics structure of party polarization. First, we find
that the difference between the parties’ moods has not
been strictly increasing, but it, instead, shows periods
of partisan convergence amidst the larger phenomenon
of polarization. Secondly, we show that mass partisan
polarization is asymmetric, driven primarily by dynam-
ics in the Republican Party’s policy sentiment that are
not shared with Democrats or independents. Finally,
we find that polarization can be viewed, at least to
some extent, as a function of the parties’ differential
responsiveness to domestic policy choices. These pat-
terns of differential responsiveness are generally con-
sistent with what would be expected given well-known
differences in values and priorities among Democratic
and Republican identifiers. These results support a
more sophisticated understanding of how and why the
parties have polarized over the last four decades and
suggest new pathways for the study of mass partisan




There is considerable evidence of mass partisan
polarization over the last four decades. At the
individual level, links between partisanship and an
array of attitudes and behaviors have strengthened
substantially since the 1970s (e.g., Abramowitz and
Saunders 1998, 2008; Bartels 2000; Hetherington
2001). In the aggregate, the political views expressed
by Republicans and Democrats have become increas-
ingly divergent on an array of policy issues (Brewer
2005; Layman and Carsey 2002). Though there
remains much disagreement over the qualitative degree
(big or small) and substantive importance (substantial
or minimal) of partisan polarization and over whether
party polarization is reflective of sharpening divisions
along other lines of political difference (Abramowitz
and Saunders 2008; Ansolabahere, Rodden, and Snyder
2006; Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Fiorina, Abrams,
and Pope 2008), even polarization minimalists concede
that the growing preference gap between the parties is a
‘‘significant development’’ (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope
2005, 37).
Despite the important insights of existing
research on mass partisan polarization, we see two
related weaknesses in this literature related to the
dynamic structure of mass opinion. First, scholarly
discussions about aggregate mass party polarization
focus primarily on interparty differences—the simple
ideological or issue distance between positions of
Democrats and Republicans. However, polarization
is, by definition, a construction of two separate,
dynamic variables: the policy preferences of the
Democratic and Republican parties in the electorate.
Viewing polarization as interparty difference alone
reflects an implicit substantive assumption that po-
larization is a symmetric phenomenon, where both
parties are simultaneously moving away from the
center of some issue space at the same time. This
need not be the case. The same degree of growth in
interparty polarization is observationally consistent
with a variety of changes in the structure of this
interparty difference (Bullock 2009). One party may
maintain relatively fixed preferences while the pref-
erences of the other change dramatically. Both parties
may move away from the center, but with one party
moving more substantially than the other. Or, parties
may move away from a fixed reference point at a
relatively even pace.
Second, studies of partisan polarization have gen-
erally developed with limited theoretical connections
to other literatures on mass opinion dynamics. In
particular, there is much evidence that, in the aggre-
gate, the mass public’s preferences respond to changes
in the state of the macroeconomy (e.g., Enns and
Kellstedt 2008) as well as the ideological direction of
spending and public policy (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen,
and Stimson 2002; Soroka and Wleizen 2010).
Changes in the ideological distance between the two
parties have, therefore, occurred against a backdrop
of other important dynamics in the macropolitical-
economy and public opinion. Yet, there is little
consideration of how the dynamics of mass partisan
polarization relate to the dynamics of mass respon-
siveness to economic conditions and policy changes.
Aggregate and Subaggregate
Opinion Dynamics
More than a half century of individual-level political
behavior research has consistently concluded that the
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ranks of well-informed, politically sophisticated Amer-
icans are sparse and that ordinary citizens are poorly
equipped to handle the responsibilities of democratic
citizenship (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964;
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Yet, scholars of macro-
politics have also consistently found that changes in the
aggregate distribution of political behaviors and atti-
tudes over time correspond sensibly and systematically
to political events, policy choices, and changes in the
political-economic context (Enns and Kellstedt 2008;
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Kramer 1971;
Page and Shapiro 1992; Soroka and Wlezien 2010).
In particular, the thermostatic model (e.g.,
Wlezien 1995, 1996) of public opinion provides
strong evidence that aggregate policy sentiment
responds to changes in the political-economy by
sending corrective signals to elected officials (e.g.,
Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002, Johnson,
Brace, and Arceneaux 2005; Kellstedt, Peterson, and
Ramirez 2010; Wlezien 1995, 1996). In the thermo-
static account, citizens use information to update
beliefs about the policy environment and, subse-
quently, to send corrective signals to elected officials.
The model is motivated by a fairly basic view of
how and why citizens respond to the political context
as they do: responsiveness is driven by the degree to
which citizens can detect whether policy is changing
in a way that is broadly consistent with their
preferred view of the world. In the thermostatic
model, when the public ‘‘detects a departure’’ from
its preferred policy, it produces a signal to adjust
policy accordingly, and once sufficiently adjusted, the
signal stops’’ (Wlezien 1995, 982). The result is that
the public’s relative preferences for ‘‘more’’ or ‘‘less’’
policy adjust in response to changes in policy and the
macroeconomy. This thermostatic model has been
applied to explain both the dynamics of federal
spending preferences and the dynamics of aggregate
policy sentiment or public mood (see, e.g., Erikson,
MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Kelly and Enns 2010;
Stevenson 2001; Stimson 1999).
The contrast between individual-level disorder and
aggregate order has led to a growing body of research
exploring ‘‘subaggregate’’ opinion dynamics. This re-
search examines how particular groups of citizens in the
electorate, stratified by some politically relevant variable,
contribute to patterns of aggregate opinion change. For
the most part, this work has concentrated on the roles
of education, sophistication, and engagement in shaping
public responsiveness and has challenged the conven-
tional wisdom that aggregate opinion movements are
driven by a small number of highly attentive, sophis-
ticated citizens (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
2002). Aggregate patterns of dynamic responsiveness
to political and economic events are not significantly
different across cleavages in education, income, voter
status, and political knowledge (Ellis and Ura 2011;
Ellis, Ura, and Robinson 2006; Enns and Kellstedt
2008; Page and Shapiro 1992; Ura and Ellis 2008;
Wlezien and Soroka 2008). Taken as a whole, this
literature supports the notion that the public is able to
systematically update policy attitudes across divisions
associated with access to information and the ability to
process it. As a result, ‘‘parallelism’’ in public opinion
movement is the norm rather than the exception.
Partisanship and Issue Priorities
Evidence of this kind of parallelism in public opinion
dynamics indicates that many citizens (even those with
low levels of information or sophistication) are capable of
detecting a departure from their preferred state of the
world and signaling policymakers accordingly. But while
information is an important part of the mass responsive-
ness story, it is not the whole story. In the mass public,
political attachments and values can influence how
individuals orient themselves toward politics and shape
patterns of political attention and informationprocessing.
In particular, because of its enormous impor-
tance in shaping how individuals perceive and
respond to the political world, party identification
is a line of political cleavage where we might expect
differential responsiveness to the political and eco-
nomic context. Partisanship is the crux of microlevel
political cognition in American politics, the prism
through which political information passes before
emerging as observable behavior. Moreover, citizens
typically connect their political identities, economic
self-interest, and other salient attachments and con-
siderations to applied political problems through
partisanship (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960).
In addition, Republican and Democratic identi-
ties generally correspond to core sets of values and
attitudes toward government that are central to
understanding American politics (Franklin and
Jackson 1983). Although there is substantial hetero-
geneity among individual partisans, Republicans and
Democrats generally hold distinct sets of core political
values.2 Though the space of contemporary American
political values, ideologies, and belief systems is
2Partisanship and values orientations are, therefore, related and
reinforcing. However, there is some evidence that party identi-
fication is more enduring than core values (Goren 2005).
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undoubtedly complex—embracing ‘‘freedom, equality,
individualism, democracy, capitalism, and several others’’
(Feldman and Zaller 1992, 271)—for many Americans,
the competing values of individualism and egalitarian-
ism dominate their engagement with the political world
(Feldman and Zaller 1992). Individualism connotes
support for personal liberty and laissez-faire economic
principles while egalitarianism includes equality and
social welfare. Within this framework, Republicans
predominantly hold the core value of individualism. In
contrast, Democrats generally evidence commitments to
both individualism and egalitarianism, creating ambiv-
alence in their political cognition that is not present to
the same extent among Republicans (Goren 2001).
Citizenswithdifferent partisan identities, especially as
those identities are reinforced by value orientations, may
react to the same objective information about the state of
the world to different degrees. In particular, political or
economic information that indicates a departure from a
preferred state of the world for one mass party may have
no such import for another. To the extent that these
differences also manifest themselves in differential pat-
terns of issue priorities, citizens with different priorities
may bemore likely to adjust their preferences in response
to certain sorts of contextual factors as opposed to others.
Democratic partisans—who, on average, emphasize both
individualism and egalitarianism—are apt to see different
problems (i.e., departures from a preferred world) in the
same set of political facts as Republican partisans—who
are, on average, attached to the value of individualism
with fewer competing considerations.
As a result, we might expect that the dynamic
policy preferences of Republicans should react more
strongly than that of Democrats to perceived viola-
tions of the values of individualism. For Republicans,
these policy choices and economic events have only a
cost in the value domain of individualism without
any offsetting gains in the value domain of egalitari-
anism. In contrast, violations of egalitarianism should
be more problematic to Democrats. The resulting
divergence in the extent of partisan responses to
political and economic conditions may have
implications for the dynamics of public preferences
regarding the size and scope of government.3
Partisan Moods
Connecting accounts of linkages between partisanship
and values with models of thermostatic dynamics in
aggregate public opinion leads to a new approach to
understanding partisan polarization and the limits of
parallelism in subaggregate opinion dynamics. Past
research indicates that the dynamics of aggregate
policy sentiment (or policy mood) are associated with
economic conditions—in particular, unemployment,
inflation, and income inequality (Enns and Kellstedt
2008; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Kelly and
Enns 2010), and public policy—in particular, domestic
and defense spending (Kellstedt, Petersen, and Ramirez
2010; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1996).
Differences in both the values and sociodemographic
bases of the major parties, combined with what we
know about the issue priorities of party leaders,
suggests the potential for systematic differences in
the extent to which Democrats and Republicans in
the mass public respond to changes in the political and
economic climate known to move aggregate policy
sentiment, creating distinctive partisan moods and the
potential for partisan polarization.
Extensive evidence of different policy priorities
between Democratic and Republican governments
(as well as similar differences in the policy priorities
of liberal and conservative governments in other
advanced democracies) provide guidance in develop-
ing expectations about specific ways in which
Republican and Democratic partisan may evidence
differential responsiveness to various political-
economic dynamics in the context of policy mood.
A long line of research, both in the American context
and cross-nationally, suggests that ‘‘left’’ and ‘‘right’’
parties prize different economic outcomes broadly
consistent with the political value structures
discussed above. Liberal governments, in general,
are more willing to trade off low levels of unemploy-
ment for high levels of inflation, while the reverse is
true for conservative governments (Alesina and Sachs
1988; Chappell and Keech 1986; Hibbs 1977; Keech
1980; Tufte 1978). Republican governments also tend
to produce higher levels of inequality than Demo-
cratic ones (e.g., Bartels 2008). Finally, Republicans
tend to express higher levels of concern over the size
of the domestic policy budget than do Democrats
(Burden and Sanberg 2003).
With respect to economic conditions, we expect
that Democrats will be more responsive to unem-
ployment than Republicans since higher levels of
unemployment more strongly offend egalitarian
3Democrats and Republicans also tend to come from different
sociodemographic backgrounds. Republicans are, on average,
richer, whiter, and more economically secure than are Democrats
(e.g., Stonecash 2001). To the extent that wealthy and less wealthy
citizens hold different political priorities, we expect class-based
differences in political responsiveness to filter into patterns of
partisan responsiveness as well. However, such differences in
partisan responsiveness to political context are likely to reinforce
the values-based differences discussed here.
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sensibilities. Moreover, Democratic elites prioritize
controlling unemployment as a matter of policy. We
expect the same to be true for income inequality,
given the obvious inegalitarian nature of growing
income disparities. Conversely, we expect Republi-
cans to be more responsive to inflation, as high levels
of inflation distort market outcomes in a way that
violates the value of individualism and is more
important to the policy agendas of Republican elites.
With respect to policy, we expect that Republican
preferences will be more responsive to domestic spend-
ing than Democrats since increases in the size of the
domestic budget—and by extension, the reach of the
federal government in redistributing wealth and solving
social problems—violate the value of individualism
(which is valued by Republicans and Democrats) to
create greater egalitarianism (which is valued by Dem-
ocrats alone). In contrast, we have mixed expectations
about the parties’ comparative responsiveness to spend-
ing on defense and national security. On one hand,
Republicans often evidence a commitment to ‘‘physical
security,’’ which involves national defense that is com-
mon in right parties in industrialized democracies (e.g.,
Budge and Farlie 1983; Inglehart 1997). This predicts
heightened Republican responsiveness to defense spend-
ing, though for reasons which are not related to the core
value conflict in which we are immediately interested.
On the other hand, defense and foreign policy occupy a
unique position in American politics reflected by the
maxim that ‘‘politics stops at the water’s edge.’’ This
predicts that Republican should not be significantly
more responsive to defense spending than Democrats.
Given these contrasting points of view, we leave our
expectations on defense spending open.
Empirical Analysis
The expected differences in the associations of
Republican and Democratic policy moods with
important elements of the economic and policy envi-
ronment lead to three complementary questions about
the aggregate policy preferences of Republicans and
Democrats. First, have partisan preferences, considered
as policy mood, diverged over time, i.e., is there
evidence that partisans’ global orientations toward
government have also polarized amidst other growing
divisions between the mass parties? If so, has polar-
ization been symmetrical, in the sense that both parties
are moving apart from one another in a roughly equal
fashion over time, or is one party’s preferences con-
tributing more strongly to polarization than the
other’s? Finally, to what extent do Democrats and
Republicans respond differently to contextual changes
in the political and economic climate? The answers to
these questions stand to shed light on how and why the
mass parties have polarized and to evaluate potentially
important links among the individual political psychol-
ogy of values, mass partisan polarization, and the
aggregate dynamics of policy mood.
Answering these questions requires, first, a meas-
ure of mass policy sentiment or policy mood.
Stimson’s (1999) mood index is perhaps the most
commonly used measure of the ideological tenor of
public opinion in empirical studies of mass opinion
change and mass-elite linkages. Stimson’s mood pro-
vides an overarching measure of preferences on the
long-standing ‘‘liberal-conservative’’ conflict over the
size and scope of the federal government (e.g.,
Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Durr 1993; Enns and
Kellstedt 2008; Kelly 2009; Smith 2000). This scope-of-
government dimension, which encompasses traditional
party conflicts over social welfare, spending, the role of
the federal government in markets and domestic
affairs, drives much of what government does in terms
of policy outputs and spending decisions (McCarty,
Poole, and Rosenthal 2006; Stonecash 2001), and, by
most accounts, still serves as the principal dividing line
in American party politics (e.g., Ansolabahere, Rodden,
and Snyder 2006; Bartels 2008).
However, Stimson’s mood index is not directly
applicable to the problem of understanding the
dynamics of partisan policy sentiment, though it
provides an important starting point for our analysis.
Mood is derived from the marginals from hundreds
of survey questions, from many survey houses, asked
irregularly over time. It cannot be disaggregated into
component parts of interest—in this case, into time
series of partisan moods. However, the measure
can serve as a benchmark against which to judge
alternative measures of longitudinal public senti-
ment. A metric that correlates strongly with mood
can be considered a valid measure of the underlying
concept of ‘‘public policy sentiment’’ as commonly
conceived, even if the measure is comprised of a far
smaller battery of issues than mood itself. Thus, in
order to assess the dynamics of Democratic and
Republican preferences, we create a proxy for mood
which captures the same dynamic shifts as mood, but
that can be disaggregated in useful ways.
To obtain such a measure, we use data from the
General Social Survey (GSS) to create a longitudinal
measure of preferences on the scope-of-government
dimension (see Ellis, Ura, and Ashley-Robinson 2006;
Enns and Kellstedt 2008; Kellstedt, Peterson, and
Ramirez 2010; Ura and Ellis 2008). In each survey year
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from 1973 to 2008, the GSS asks a battery of questions
related to preferences for government spending on a
variety of issues (questions and coding in the online
appendix).4 Responses to each of these questions are
coded for liberal-conservative content, with the most
liberal answer receiving a score of ‘‘1,’’ and the most
conservative receiving a score of ‘‘0.’’ Responses to these
items are summed for each respondent, creating an
individual-level measure of preferences for the preferred
size and scope of the federal government. Taking the
mean of the resulting individual scores within each
survey year produces an aggregate measure of the
public’s overall liberal-conservative policy sentiment.
To aid in interpretation, we rescale the resulting 10-
issue index to a 0–100 scale (with higher values
indicating greater liberalism).5 This aggregate policy
liberalism indicator correlates with the Stimson’s index
at 0.86. Both are therefore indicators of the same
dimension of mass preferences.
This measure of mood preferences can be disag-
gregated into components of interest by averaging
individual liberalism scores across subsets of the
GSS sample. In this case, we generate partisan mood
indicators for Independents, Republicans, and
Democrats (treating ‘‘leaning’’ independents as parti-
sans) by aggregating microlevel policy liberalism scores
across the relevant subgroups of the sample for each
year. The resulting series are illustrated in Figure 1.
Two observations are immediately evident. First,
there is a persistent preference gap between Democrats
and Republicans; Republicans are consistently more
conservative than Democrats. Second, despite the
difference in the parties’ relative levels of preference
for policy, the two series have considerable shared
variance over time, correlating at 0.73 (r2 5 0.53). In
all of the series, we see the same basic shifts in
preferences—a move toward conservatism in the
period leading to the Reagan election, a movement
toward the left afterward, increased conservatism in the
Clinton years—that underlie much dynamic opinion
movement in the United States over the past four
decades (e.g., Stimson 2004). That the basic dynamics
of mood hold for both parties suggests that, to a large
degree, each partisan group responds similarly to
changes in the political and economic environment.
To whatever extent polarization may be occurring, it is
occurring against a backdrop of broad similarity in
party-specific opinion movement.
Party Polarization in Mood?
Despite the strong similarity we observe in the dynam-
ics of Republican and Democratic moods, roughly half
of the variance in the two series is not shared. More-
over, Democratic and Republican policy sentiments
have generally moved away from one another in the
past decade. The lower pane of Figure 1 shows the
interparty preference difference (Democratic mood
minus Republican mood) during the observed period.
An OLS model of the difference between the party
moods expressed as a function of an annual counter
and a constant returns an estimated coefficient of 0.20
for the counter (with a standard error of 0.03). This
simple temporal effect predicts a seven-point increase in
interparty mood difference from 1973 to 2008. As a
point of comparison, the observed range of the aggre-
gate GSS mood proxy in the same period is 12 points.
The data thus provide evidence that the aggre-
gate moods of Republicans and Democrats prefer-
ences have polarized since 1973. This result is
important for our analysis, as it indicates at least
some correspondence between the literature on
public mood and the literature on mass partisan
polarization. Parties are indeed polarizing on the
mood preference space. This growth in partisan
divergence, however, has not been monotonically
positive. Though the last four decades can be
generally characterized as a period of growing
polarization, the dynamics of the interparty prefer-
ence gap are more complicated than that. Instead,
the series show distinct periods of both polarization
and convergence. From the beginning of the time
series in 1973 through 1976, Republicans and
Democrats exhibited converging preferences. How-
ever, this move towards consensus ended near the
end of the Carter administration, leading to a period
of partisan divergence that peaked in 1980. Con-
versely, the 1980s were largely a period of depola-
rization; by 1990, the interparty difference reached
its lowest level since 1976. During the early 1990s,
polarization increased sharply, peaking in 1996.
After a brief decline in the late 1990s, the 2000s
have seen marked increases in polarization.
4Principal components factor analysis shows that 10 of the 11
spending questions asked in each survey year load on a single
dominant factor, suggesting that they are all tapping broadly the
same concept. The eleventh question, dealing with preferences for
spending on space exploration, does not share common variance
with the other 10 questions, and is excluded from the analysis.
5The GSS was not conducted in 1979, 1981, 1992 nor in odd-
numbered years since 1993. Linear interpolation (LI), cubic
spline interpolation (CSI), and multiple imputation (MI) via
predictive mean matching of the missing values return imputed
time series that are substantively identical to one another. The
time series produced by LI and CSI correlate at 0.99, and those
produced by LI and MI (averaging five imputations) correlate at
0.98. Given overwhelming the similarity of the resulting series, we
use LI, the simplest of the three methods, in these analyses.
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Asymmetry in Partisan Polarization?
We have observed significant but irregular polarization
in the moods of Democratic and Republican partisans
over the past 40 years. These changes in the differences
between the mean positions of mass partisans—pola-
rization with limited periods of convergence—can be
conceived of as deviations from this parallelism. If
periods of high polarization are more likely to be
characterized by an exaggerated movement by one
party relative to the dynamic political center, then we
can see evidence that polarization has been asymmetric.
The difficult part is defining the political ‘‘center,’’
since mass policy sentiment is relative and dynamic.
We employ the preferences of independents to
measure the political center and to understand whether
party polarization has been symmetric—with both
parties contributing roughly equally to interparty
divergence—or asymmetric. The preferences of inde-
pendents track closely (r50.92) with aggregate mood.
Further, independents’ policy sentiment should simply
react to the macrolevel context without any systematic
partisan biases that may cause one party to become
more or less liberal regardless of real changes in
political and economic conditions. If both party’s
preference dynamics correspond relatively equally to
independents’, then we may conclude that polarization
is a symmetric phenomenon, with Democrats and
Republicans simultaneously growing farther apart, even
as they respond in fundamentally similar ways to the
political world. But if one party’s preferences corre-
spond less closely to those of independents than the
other, then we have at least suggestive evidence that the
idiosyncratic party’s opinion dynamics contribute most
heavily to aggregate polarization.
Table 1 presents the results of four models of
independent mood predicted from the partisan mood
series. The first and second columns report OLS
estimates of independent mood predicted by its own
first lag and contemporaneous values of Democratic
and Republican mood, respectively. The third
column reports estimates of a combined model,
predicting independent mood from its own first lag,
Democratic mood, and Republican mood. Finally,
the fourth column presents estimates of a model of
the first difference of independent mood expressed as
a function of the first differences of both partisan
mood series. This final model is useful for ensuring
that inferences derived from the prior models are not
the result of spurious relationships among the un-
differenced partisan mood series. None of these
models is meant to imply or assess causal relation-
ships among the various mood series. They are
merely a tool to identify asymmetry in the partisan
polarization we observed above by assessing the
extent to which each partisan mood series is related
to the dynamics preferences of the political ‘‘center.’’
Across the models, there is clear evidence that
independent mood is more strongly related to Demo-
cratic mood than Republican mood. Comparing the
results presented in the first two columns, we see that
the coefficient for Democratic mood (0.65) is more than
twice as large as that estimated for Republican mood
(0.28). This difference is statistically significant
(p, 0.05; two-tailed test). Moreover, the model of
independent mood estimated from Democratic mood
explains an additional 18% of the observed variance in
the dependent time series than the model estimated with
Republican mood. The relative strength of the associa-
tion between Democratic and independent moods is
FIGURE 1 Partisan Moods and Partisan
Polarization, 1973–2008
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also evident in the combined model reported in the
third column. While Democratic mood remains a
significant predictor of independent mood, the esti-
mated association between Republican mood and in-
dependent mood is small and statistically insignificant.
The model estimates reported in the column 4
lead to the same conclusion: the association between
Democratic mood and independent mood is stronger
than the association between Republican mood and
independent mood. Once again, changes in Demo-
cratic mood are significant predictors of changes in
independent mood, while the first difference of
Republican mood provides no significant additional
explanatory power. Moreover, by differencing the
series, we ensure that the substantive inference we
derive from previous models is not merely artifacts of
temporal dynamics in the raw time series.
Using independents as a proxy for the political
center, we find evidence of asymmetry in the dynamics
of partisan moods. Independent mood is more strongly
associated with Democratic mood than Republican
mood. (Indeed, the simple bivariate correlation between
independent mood and Democratic mood is 0.92.
Republican mood correlates with both the Democratic
and independent mood series at 0.73.) This result
suggests that convergence or divergence between the
preferences of Republicans and Democrats is not the
result of a symmetric change in partisan policy senti-
ment relative to a dynamic neutral point. Rather, this
analysis indicates that Republican mood exhibits idio-
syncratic behavior and, as a result, that partisan polar-
ization may be thought of as an asymmetrical process.
This result also helps to illustrate that conceiving of
polarization as a function of separate, related variables
has considerable value in understanding changes in the
structure of partisan polarization over time.
Differential Partisan
Responsiveness?
We now turn to an evaluation of the extent to which
partisan differences in dynamic responsiveness to
changes in national political-economic context can
account for the asymmetry in mass polarization. We
take a direct approach to the problem, estimating a
standard model of aggregate mood for each of the two
partisan mood series and then testing for parameter
equality between the models. Specifically, we model
Republican and Democratic moods as a function of
federal domestic spending per capita, defense spending
per capita, inflation, unemployment, and income in-
equality (see e.g., Durr 1993; Enns and Kellstedt 2008;
Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Stimson 2004).6
TABLE 1 Independent Mood as a Function of Partisan Moods
Predictor
DV: Independent Moodt DV: DIndependent Moodt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent Moodt-1 0.05 (0.12) 0.56* (0.14) 0.14 (0.13)
Democratic Moodt 0.65* (0.09) 0.62* (0.10)
Republican Moodt 0.28* (0.12) 0.08 (0.09)
DDemocratic Moodt-1 0.79* (0.26)
DRepublican Moodt 0.08 (0.14)
Constantt 0.16* (0.04) 0.12* (0.06) 0.15* (0.04) 0.00 (0.00)
Fit and Diagnostics
R2 0.85 0.67 0.86 0.41
Dickey-Fuller Test (b) -0.91* -1.00* -0.93* -1.35*
Breusch-Pagan Test (X2) 0.00 0.25 0.11 0.77
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test (X2) 0.35 0.00 0.47 4.30*
Note: Unless otherwise noted, cell entries are OLS regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses; Newey-West standard errors
reported in column 4). *p#0.05 (one-tailed tests); N535. Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis of a unit root process in each
model’s residuals. Breush-Pagan tests assess the null hypothesis of constant variance in each model’s residuals. Breusch-Godfrey LM
tests assess the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in each model’s residuals.
6Domestic spending is all federal spending, including Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, less outlays for defense,
foreign aid, federal law enforcement (including homeland secur-
ity), and debt service reported by the Policy Agendas Project
(Baumgartner and Jones 2010). Defense spending is federal
spending on defense subfunctions reported by the Policy Agendas
Project (Baumgartner and Jones 2010). All spending data are in
constant 2008 dollars. Inflation is the percentage change in the
annual Consumer Price Index, and unemployment is the annual
rate of unemployment (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009a, 2009b).
Income inequality is the percentage of taxable income earned by
the top 1% of wage earners (Piketty and Saez 2006).
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We expect that higher levels of defense spending
and inflation will be associated with lower levels of
policy liberalism for both sets of partisans and that
increased domestic spending and unemployment will
predict increasing liberalism in both parties mood.
However, as we discussed above, the association
between core values and mass partisanship leads us
to expect that Republican mood will respond more
strongly to federal domestic spending and inflation
than Democratic mood. In contrast, we expect that
Democratic mood will respond more strongly to
levels of unemployment and income inequality than
Republican mood.7
We model the dynamic influence of these pre-
dictors for changes in the Democratic and Republican
partisan mood series using a single-equation error
correction model (ECM). The ECM is an alternative
specification of the autoregressive distributed lag
model and provides estimates of both the short-
and long-term effects of independent variables on a
dependent variable. The error-correction model is
often used with integrated series, but is also
appropriate for use with nonintegrated series as well
(DeBoef and Keele 2008).
In the bivariate case, the error correction model
takes the following form:
DYt ¼ a0 þ a1Yt1 þ b1DXt þ b2DXt1 þ et:
Each independent variable has two parameter
estimates associated with it. The first, b1, represents
the effects of a short-term change in a particular
independent variable on changes in the dependent
variable. If public policy were to move in a liberal
direction, for example, b1 would capture the imme-
diate effect of this liberal move on public opinion.
This effect occurs entirely at a particular point in time
and decays at the rate indicated by the error correc-
tion parameter.
The total long-run impact of a change in the
independent variable on the dependent variable is a
function of both b2 (the long run coefficient) and a1
(the error-correction coefficient). This total long-run
effect—the long-run multiplier—is distributed over
time. The error correction coefficient is an estimate
of how quickly total long-term effects accumulate.
The ratio of b2 and a1 indicates the total long-run
effect of Y on X, which can also be estimated
statistically by the Beweley transformation of the
ECM (DeBoef and Keele 2008).
Table 2 reports seemingly unrelated regression
estimates of error-correction models of Republican
and Democratic policy moods as well as differences
between the parameters of each predictor for the two
partisan mood models. As a baseline, we see that both
parties react in the expected direction to public
policy, with increased defense spending moving both
parties in a liberal direction, and increased domestic
spending moving them both in a conservative
direction. Similarly, we observe significant respon-
siveness to macroeconomic conditions in both mass
parties. Republicans and Democrats both become
more conservative in response to growing inflation
and more liberal in response to growing income
inequality. However, estimated responses to unem-
ployment are insignificant for both parties. These
model estimates generally recapture the principal
empirical observations of the literature on the dynam-
ics of mood (e.g., Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson
2002; Kellstedt, Peterson, and Ramirez 2010).
However, the primary issue for our analysis is not
whether each party’s responses to various political-
economic conditions are different from zero, but
7Before proceeding, we note that this exercise places great
demands on our data in several ways. The GSS preference data
begin in 1973. This provides few observations for aggregate
analysis. Additionally, the early 1970s is an unfortunate starting
point for these data. Elite partisan polarization and income
inequality both exhibit local minima in these years, trending
upward afterward (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Like-
wise, real domestic and defense spending also increase generally
(though more unevenly) throughout the subsequent period of
time. These localized trends create collinearity problems for
multivariate analysis of data derived from the time period we
are able to observe.
These problems are unavoidable consequences of using GSS
data. We can, however, check the robustness of our models by
estimating two reduced form models of the partisan mood series
in addition to the full models. The first predicts Republican and
Democratic moods as functions of domestic and defense spend-
ing only. The second predicts mass partisan policy sentiment as
functions of inflation, unemployment, and income inequality.
This strategy separates the two most strongly correlated predictor
time series, domestic spending and income inequality, providing
a chance to observe the predicted effects of each separately to
check for robustness. None of the estimates in the reduced form
models are statistically distinguishable from those reported in the
full model. Moreover, the full model outperforms either reduced
form model for both Republican and Democratic moods in terms
of the proportion of explained variance, predictive accuracy, and
model selection statistics which balance explanatory power and
parsimony (e.g., adjusted R2 and Akaike Information Criterion).
A report of these additional model estimates are available in the
online appendix.
Even with these analytic safeguards, though, the limited
number of observations and temporal structure of our data
argue against overreading our model estimates. Instead, the
models should be regarded as exploratory. They show us whether
differences in the associations between each partisan mood series
and various elements of the macro political-economic context are
consistent with our claims, and they provide some guidance
about whether polarization can be considered in part a function
of differential responsiveness, and if so, which contextual factors
are more or less likely suspects in explaining polarization.
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whether the parties’ responses to these conditions are
different from one another. In particular, we focus on
differences that emerge in the estimated long-run
multipliers associated with the various predictors of
changes in the partisan moods. These estimates
reflect the total long-run (asymptotic) change in the
respective mood indices associated with a unit change
in a predictor variable. We are most interested in the
long-run multiplier because the difference of each
party’s long-run multiplier for each independent
variable indicates the equilibrium change in polar-
ization (or convergence) we would expect to observe
in the partisan mood series in response to a unit
change in the predictor series. In contrast, short-run
effects decay over time as a function of the error
correction parameter (though they may represent
politically salient disequilibrations), and long-run
effects alone are misleading unless transformed into
long-run multipliers in relation to the error correc-
tion parameter.
Comparative analysis of these estimated partisan
responses to changing political-economic conditions
yields some support for our comparative expectations
regarding partisan values and heterogeneity in parti-
san preference dynamics. In terms of spending, the
model predicts that Republican mood responds more
strongly to the dynamics of both domestic spending
and defense spending than Democratic mood. How-
ever, only one of these differences—that associated
with partisan responses to domestic spending—is
statistically distinguishable from zero (p50.02).
The long-run multiplier associated with an in-
crease of ten billion dollars in federal spending is
about two and a half times larger for Republican
TABLE 2 Error Correction Models of Partisan Moods
Republican Democrat |Difference|
Long Run Multipliers
Domestic Spending $10Bt-1 -0.28* (0.08) -0.11* (0.02) 0.17*
Defense Spending $10Bt-1 0.52* (0.15) 0.29* (0.05) 0.23
Inflationt-1 -0.57* (0.28) -0.47* (0.19) 0.10
Unemploymentt-1 -0.17 (0.83) 0.49 (0.37) 0.66
Top 1% Income Sharet-1 2.45* (0.94) 1.54* (0.27) 0.91
Long Run Effects
Domestic Spending $10Bt-1 -0.11* (0.02) -0.07* (0.02) 0.04
Defense Spending $10Bt-1 0.21* (0.05) 0.20* (0.06) 0.01
Inflationt-1 -0.23* (0.12) -0.33* (0.16) 0.10
Unemploymentt-1 -0.07 (0.33) 0.34 (0.24) 0.41
Top 1% Income Sharet-1 0.99* (0.34) 1.07* (0.28) 0.08
Short Run Effects
DDomestic Spending $10Bt -0.04 (0.03) -0.07* (0.04) 0.03
DDefense Spending $10Bt 0.43* (0.09) 0.14* (0.07) 0.29*
DInflationt -0.12 (0.19) -0.03 (0.14) 0.09
DUnemploymentt 0.12 (0.29) 0.68* (0.41) 0.56
DTop 1% Income Sharet 1.03* (0.23) 0.76* (0.23) 0.27
Error Correction and Constant
Error Correction (Partisan Moodt-1) -0.40* (0.09) -0.69* (0.17) 0.29
Constantt 16.80* (6.81) 33.93* (5.49) 17.13
Fit and Diagnostics
R2 0.59 0.59
Dickey-Fuller Test (b) -1.15* -1.08*
Breusch-Pagan Test (X2) 0.01 0.40
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test (X2) 1.42 0.70
Unless otherwise noted, cell entries are seemingly unrelated regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses). *p#0.05 (one-tailed
tests); N535. Long-run multipliers (LRMs) are the ratio of each variable’s long run parameter and the error correction parameter for
each partisan mood series (bi/a1) with variance estimates computed using the formula for approximating the variance of the ratio of
two coefficients reported by DeBoef and Keele (2008). The difference column reports the absolute difference between coefficient
estimates for models of Republican and Democratic moods and indicates the results of two-tailed tests of the null hypothesis of no
difference between the estimates (*p#0.05). Dickey-Fuller tests assess the null hypothesis of a unit root process in each model’s
residuals. Breush-Pagan tests assess the null hypothesis of constant variance in each model’s residuals. Breusch-Godfrey LM tests assess
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in each model’s residuals.
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mood (-0.28) than Democratic mood (-0.11). The
long-run multiplier represents the association be-
tween changes in the political-economic context
and the partisan mood series through an error
correction process. For example, the model predicts
Republican mood would begin to adjust to a ten
billion dollar increase in federal domestic spending at
time t during the next time period, t+1, at a rate
indicated by the error correction parameter (-0.40)
and to a degree indicated by the long-run multiplier
(-0.28). In particular, the model predicts that Repub-
lican mood would decrease 0.11 points (the long-run
effect) at t+1, which is 40% of the total long-run
effect (which corresponds to the error correc-
tion parameter of -0.40). At t+2, the model predicts
that Republican mood will realize 40% of the
remaining adjustment (about 0.07 points). This
pattern continues at each subsequent time point until
the total long-run effect indicated by the long-run
multiplier has accumulated. For Republicans, the
estimated error correction parameter in the full
model indicates a median lag length of two years
and that 90% of the total long-run effect is in place by
the fifth year after a change in variable predictor
associated with significant long-run effect. For Dem-
ocrats, the estimates rate of error correction is
somewhat faster (-0.69). The model predicts that
median lag length for Democrats is one year and that
more than 90% of the total long-run effect of a
change in a predictor is in place within two years.
Holding all else constant, a ten billion dollar
increase in domestic spending is expected to polarize
the parties by 0.17 points on the 100-point Mood
index over the long run. However, domestic spending
has increased roughly three trillion dollars in the
observed period (about 307 tens of billions of
dollars), predicting a much more substantial cumu-
lative effect, approximately 52 points holding, all else
constant. Though this point estimate should be taken
with a grain of salt, this model indicates that
increasing domestic spending has the potential to
contribute substantially to party polarization. Both
Democrats and Republicans respond to changes in
domestic spending in the expected thermostatic way:
by updating their preferences in a conservative
direction. But because Republican preferences re-
spond more strongly to domestic spending, this
change in policy will drive the parties farther apart.
Estimates of partisan responses to defense spend-
ing reflect our contrasting theoretical predictions.
The model indicates that Republican mood is more
responsive to the dynamics of defense spending than
Democratic mood. However, this difference is not
statistically distinguishable from zero (p50.17;
two-tailed test). Taking the model estimates at face
value, an increase of ten billion dollars in defense
spending predicts a total long-run increase of 0.54
points in Republican mood and only 0.29 points in
Democratic mood. This prediction implies that
increased defense spending yields partisan conver-
gence—both parties moving in a liberal direction, but
Republicans moving to a greater degree, ‘‘catching
up’’ with Democrats.
In contrast to differences in estimated partisan
responses to policy, observed differences in patterns
of partisan responsiveness to economic conditions
are less consistent with expectations. Differences
between the parties responses to inflation and un-
employment are correctly signed, but neither are
significantly different from zero. In the case of
inflation, both Republicans and Democrats respond
to increasing inflation by becoming more conserva-
tive, reducing their demands for government services
and benefits over the long run. The Republican long-
run multiplier is -0.57; the Democratic long-run
multiplier is -0.47. The difference between the two
estimates is substantively small, however, and not
significant (p50.39).
Likewise, the model predicts that Democrats
respond to rising unemployment by becoming more
liberal over the long run than Republicans. Each
point increase in the rate of unemployment predicts
that Democratic mood increases by about half a point
(0.49), while Republican mood falls by 0.17 point.
However, neither party’s estimated total long-run
response to changes in unemployment is significantly
different than zero, nor are the estimates statistically
distinguishable from one another (p50.23). More-
over, the estimated difference in the parties’ re-
sponses to the dynamics of inequality is incorrectly
signed. Contrary to our expectations, the long-run
multiplier of income inequality is larger for Repub-
licans (2.44) than for Democrats (1.54). Once again,
though, the difference between the two parties’
predicted responses to the state of the macroeconomy
is not significant (p50.72).
These findings suggest an account of asymmetric
partisan polarization resulting from differential re-
sponses to domestic policy choices amidst parallel
partisan responses to macroeconomic conditions.
These results are also consistent with our prior
observation of increasing divergence and asymmetry
in between the partisan mood series generated from
GSS data. Indeed, the estimated models yield
predicted changes in the partisan mood series that
correspond strongly with observed changes in
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partisan policy sentiment and which reconstruct the
partisan mood series. The observed and predicted
changes in the partisan mood series are shown in the
upper panels of Figure 2; the cumulative predicted
changes in the partisan mood series are plotted in the
lower panels along with the actual partisan mood
series. The strong fit between observed and predicted
changes in the partisan mood series indicates that our
model is a reasonable reflection of the political
dynamics that have produced the observed diver-
gence between Republican and Democratic policy
sentiment.
Conclusions
In this article, we have made a first step toward
integrating two prominent bodies of research on the
aggregate distributions of political attitudes in the
United States—the literature on mass partisan po-
larization and the literature on the thermostatic
dynamics of policy mood. By disaggregating parti-
san polarization and focusing on the constituent
preferences of Democrats and Republicans, we are
able to evaluate theoretical connections between
microlevel research on partisanship with macrolevel
research on the dynamics of policy sentiment to
produce novel empirical predictions about the
comparative behavior of partisan moods. Using data
from the GSS, we show that party polarization is a
dynamic, asymmetric phenomenon, driven largely
by the preferences of the Republican Party and
explained, at least in part, by the differential re-
sponsiveness of the two parties to domestic policy
choices. We find less support for our expectations
that partisans are differentially responsive to macro-
economic conditions.
FIGURE 2 Predicted and Observed Dynamics in Partisan Moods
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This set of results suggests more general conclu-
sions about the nature and dynamics of the current
period of mass partisan polarization, at least as it has
been expressed in the mood preference space. First, our
analysis emphasizes that the same degree of change in
partisan polarization may be observationally equivalent
with a variety of changes in the structure of interparty
opinion differences. By focusing on the dynamics of
Republican and Democratic preferences rather than the
dynamics of the difference between them, this work
offers a novel analytical perspective on the problem of
mass partisan polarization that may provide a useful
starting point for future extensions of theories of mass
partisan divergence and convergence.
Second, though partisan moods exhibit distinguish-
able patterns of responsiveness to domestic spending,
differences in average responses to changing economic
conditions are substantively small and statistically in-
significant. This suggests that the current period of
partisan polarization has principally proceeded from
differential partisan responses to policy choices rather
than diverging responses to policy problems.
Third, it is important to keep in mind that polar-
ization in partisan moods has occurred amidst sub-
stantial parallelism in the parties’ responses to the
macropolitical context. Indeed, more than half of the
variance in the partisan mood series is shared. This
indicates that partisan polarization may more generally
emerge from one party’s more rapid adjustment to an
emerging state of the world or a new issue, rather than
a more fundamental divergence in political worldviews.
This pattern is evident in our data and conforms to
patterns observed in particular issue domains. For
example, Republicans and Democrats in the mass
public have polarized over issues of gay rights since
the 1970s; however, growing divergence in the mass
parties’ levels of expressed support for gay rights masks
substantial increases in support for gay rights that have
occurred in both parties (Lindaman and Haider-
Markel 2002). Partisan polarization is merely an
artifact of a more rapid increase in pro-gay rights
sentiment among Democrats than Republicans.
The concepts of partisan moods and of polarization
as differential responsiveness can help to lay the ground-
work for more nuanced studies of mass polarization and
mass preference dynamics.8 First, future research might
explore the possibility that partisans react differently to
policy or the macroeconomy depending on whether
their own party is in control of government. In other
words, partisans may gauge responses to changing
policies or economic conditions differently if their
own party is ‘‘responsible’’ for them. This speculation
is seemingly consistent with the substantial evidence that
partisans evaluate the economy and its prospects more
positively when their party controls the presidency (e.g.,
Bartels 2000).
Our results also invite a more explicit consider-
ation of the mass-elite linkages that shape the ways in
which citizens receive and react to political informa-
tion. We have focused primarily on political and
contextual change here, implicitly neglecting the role
that political elites might play in shaping polarization
among partisans. Given the growing ability of parti-
sans to self-select into media outlets that share their
point of view (Iyengar and Hahn 2009), for example,
the political information that citizens receive may
itself be a critical driver of differences in party-
specific opinion change—citizens of different parties
may simply be reacting to different information. This
argument might also be integrated with Hacker and
Pierson’s (2005) claim that elite-level polarization
might have been asymmetrically driven by the Re-
publican Party: if the ideological extremity of elite
party cues are themselves asymmetric, it is natural to
expect that mass parties would follow suit.
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